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Context Data Acquisition Using Adaptive
Non-repudiation Model
Marcin Alan Tunia
Abstract—The subject of this study is the non-repudiation
security service for network communication using TCP/IP stack.
Generated evidence, as well as decision-making process of
registering a given event, are context-aware. Non-repudiation
is equipped with context-awareness by using widely utilized
network tools. The aim of this paper is to present timing
results for selected tools execution and to complete the evidence
generation time. In some applications it is crucial to gather
evidence data as fast as possible because of the rapidly changing
network environment. For such situations, in case of prolonged
execution time, an output from a tool might imprecisely describe
the contextual situation from the time of the occurrence of an
event.
Keywords—non-repudiation, contextual security, adaptive se-
curity, non-repudiation model
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENT advances in computer science lead towardsmultiservice and ubiquitous networking and computing.
The Internet of Things paradigm is being implemented
in a wide range of solutions, which causes the presence
of high diversity of the machines connected to public
and private networks. Security solutions have to evolve to
follow these changes and implement advanced protection
mechanisms to counteract new threats. One of the modern
security properties is context awareness, which allows for
building of flexible security services, able to counteract new,
unknown threats. The field of context-aware security services
is being intensively studied but not in all areas uniformly.
Authentication is an example of a widely studied subject in
this area. However non-repudiation, which may be considered
a stronger authentication, is not studied with equal intensity.
In author’s opinion there is a need to develop flexible
non-repudiation, able to provide context-aware evidence, to
meet current development in military [1] and civil systems
[2] [3].
Non-repudiation is one of the security services, which
is being implemented in wide range of systems, including
commercial and military ones. Systems processing confidential
data constitute an example. Full accountability is usually
required in this case, including reliable evidence generation.
Literature provides various definitions of non-repudiation [4]
[5] [6] [7]. The definition used for the purpose of this paper
is as follows [8]:
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Non-repudiation is a security service which assures
unambiguous and objective post-factum ascertainment that
given subject performed given action.
The main aim of non-repudiation service is to generate,
store, distribute and verify evidence [9]. Content may
vary between different pieces of evidence and depend on
requirements for system being protected as well as on
non-repudiation policy. Non-repudiation evidence analysis
may be a part of post-factum analysis process leading to
reconstruction of the most probable scenario of events which
might happen. Thus a piece of evidence is the most valuable if
it contains the most useful pieces of information about event
being investigated. Such useful information may constitute
context concerning each entity taking part in the event.
According to Dey at al. context may be defined as follows
[10]:
Context is any information that can be used to characterize
the situation of entities (i.e., whether a person, place, or
object) that are considered relevant to the interaction between
a user and an application, including the user and the
application themselves.
Context data usage for the purpose of security services
is investigated by contextual security approach. By utilizing
context data, security services are able to provide higher level
of flexibility and higher level of security in comparison with
standard security services. For non-repudiation, inclusion of
additional data in evidence, concerning context of entities
taking part in event being registered, may deliver additional
information in a process of post-factum analysis. In the next
sections of this paper there is described implementation of
adaptable context-aware non-repudiation security service and
results of contextual data acquisition time are investigated.
II. ADAPTIVE NON-REPUDIATION MODEL
In comparison with standard non-repudiation services being
implemented in nowadays systems, the new property of non-
repudiation presented in this paper is the ability to adapt
content of piece of evidence and type of those pieces being
generated. Figure 1 presents difference between standard and
contextual non-repudiation. Different steps are marked blue.
Both types of non-repudiation wait for certain event to happen.
Standard service generates evidence with previously defined
strict structure, stores it in the repository and verifies if needed.
Contextual non-repudiation service verifies context of an event
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including involved entities’ context, performs context-based
risk analysis and according to its results generates evidence
with content adequate to current situation. Then pieces of


















Fig. 1. Standard and contextual non-repudiation comparison
Figure 2 presents flow chart for standard evidence gen-
eration process and figure 3 presents contextual evidence
generation process. Part of a figure marked in grey rectangle








Fig. 2. Standard evidence generation process
The model of non-repudiation used for the purpose of
this paper is presented in figure 4. There are two types of
main operations: generation of pieces of evidence - G and
verification of evidence - W . Evidence generation block has
two main inputs: contextual description of an event z and key
used to secure a piece of evidence being generated - kg . A
Users' actions monitoring
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determine content of the 
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Fig. 3. Contextual evidence generation process
piece of evidence d is generated by block G. This piece can
then be verified by block W using security key kw, which is
paired with key kg . In particular both keys can be the same,
for example while using symmetric cryptography based non-
repudiation. While using asymmetric cryptography kg may be
considered a private key of a generating entity and kw may be
considered a public key complementary to kg . The result of
verification block operation is binary decision w: 1 - evidence




d = G(z,kg) w = W(d,kw)
Fig. 4. Non-repudiation simplified model
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III. ASSUMPTIONS FOR MODEL IMPLEMENTATION
The following assumptions were made for the purpose of
the implementation being described:
• Non-repudiation security service is based on trusted third
party, which generates reliable evidence,
• Non-repudiation security service keeps records on cer-
tain network events, which are identified using packets
analysis,
• Non-repudiation security service is implemented on a
server which is properly protected against unauthorized
access (physical and through a network),
• Software running on a server is constantly updated in
order to minimize risk which results from bugs lowering
security level,
• Cryptographic keys used for securing pieces of evidence
are kept in secure manner and are protected against
disclosure to unauthorized entities.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
The architecture of the service is composed of a trusted
server for an evidence generation, a port mirrored traffic
of protected link, an intrusion detection system acting as
a communication context analyzer, a set of tools for infor-
mation gathering acting as context gathering tools for an
evidence content, an evidence-generation engine using XML
digital signatures [11] with strong cryptographic algorithms.
The mirrored traffic from the protected link is forwarded to
a trusted server on which further processing is performed.
Packets received by the trusted server are processed by an
intrusion detection system engine, which searches anomalies
according to the defined signatures. If an anomaly is detected,
adequate tools are launched to gather contextual input for
an evidence. After the collection of all tools output, the
evidence is generated. The figure 5 presents architecture of
the implementation. The abbreviation are as follows:
• MON-NET - Monitored network for which pieces of
evidence are generated,
• MON-NET - Public network which is connected to mon-
itored network. This connection is monitored by non-
repudiation enabled network equipment,
• I-IE-NRS - Interface between port-mirroring enabled net-
work equipment and intrusion detection system (IDS),
• I-INC - Interface between IDS and evidence generation
module (EGM) used to pass incidents alert from IDS to
EGM,
• I-EG-DB - Interface between EGM and database used to
transfer pieces of evidence to the repository (evidence
database),
• I-CON-PUB - Interface between EGM and public net-
work. This interface is used by context gathering tools
for the purpose of acquisition context about site located
in public network,
• I-CON-MON - Interface between EGM and monitored
network. This interface is used by context gathering tools


















Fig. 5. Implementation architecture
The figure 6 shows example of XML-based piece of evi-
dence, which is being signed by generating site. The elements
are as follows:
• Numerical identifier of non-repudiation policy under
which the piece of evidence is being generated,
• Alfanumerical identifier of non-repudiation type (e.g.
non-repudiation of origin, non-repudiation of submission,
non-repudiation of receiving, non-repudiation of transfer),
• The description of an alert, which was generated by an
IDS and passed to EGM,
• Context description of a sender of the packet which
caused IDS alert. The context is in the form of results
from context gathering tools,
• Context description of a recipient of the packet which
caused IDS alert. The context is in the form of results
from context gathering tools,
• Date and time of evidence generation.
Research was done on the following tools: nslookup [12],
nmap [13], whois [14], ping, online geolocalization service
ipinfo.io [15] and offline geolocalization service geoiplookup
[16]. Table I contains short description of each tool, which
was evaluated according to the execution time.
V. RESEARCH ON EVIDENCE GENERATION
On the basis of prepared implementation the research on
evidence generation time was conducted. The time of full
evidence generation was measured as well as the time of each
contextual tool output generation. For each incident alerted by
IDS a piece of evidence was generated with all context data
available (corresponding maximum risk situation) and another
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Fig. 6. Example of XML-based piece of evidence
TABLE I
CONTEXT DELIVERY TOOLS USED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION
Tool name Description
Nslookup Tool used to query DNS servers.
ipinfo.io Tool used to estimate physical location of
the host. It requires IP address or URL and
queries online localization databases.
geoiplookup Tool used to estimate physical location
of the host like ipinfo.io but it queries
local, previously downloaded localization
databases.
nmap Tool used for network exploration and se-
curity audits. This network scanner deliv-
ers various data (e.g. open ports, running
services, used operating system) on devices
reachable through a network.
whois Tool used to query WHOIS databases for
information on users and owners of Internet
resources.
ping Tool used to run network diagnostics with
ICMP protocol.
one with basic data (corresponding minimum risk situation).
The properties of the experiment are as follows:
• Research was conducted in university production envi-
ronment,
• 780 pieces of evidence were generated and stored,
• Pieces of evidence were being collected during 45 days,
• Platform used for the experiment was Ubuntu 16.04.2
LTS, 16GB RAM, AMD FX(tm)-4170 Quad-Core Pro-
cessor, 4,2Ghz.
Figure 7 presents obtained results of generation time
measurement for a piece of evidence with maximum and
minimum risk level. Evidence generation time for minimum
risk is approximately constant and the values are from
0,07s to 15,21s with mean 0,55s and median 0,13s. Such low
results are a consequence of registering only basic information
without deep context inquiry. Pieces of evidence for minimum
risk contain only the following context parameters: IPv4
addresses for sender and recipient, local time of evidence
generating site, the description of an alert generated by an IDS.
Evidence generation time for maximum risk is diversified
and has values from 5,09s to 294,37s with mean 52,31s and
median 43,34s. Such spread of values is caused among others
by application of tools which produce results in diversified
time depending on network conditions as well as on the
machines of packets’ senders and recipients. This drawback
is recompensed with additional context data valuable for post-
factum analysis of evidence.
Fig. 7. Evidence generation time for different risk levels
Figures 8 and 9 present results of execution time measure-
ment for maximum risk evidence with a breakdown by each
context delivery tool used for sender and receiver of a packet
causing IDS alert. Table II presents description of abbrevi-
ations used in the figures. Implementation involves parallel
invocation of context delivery tools to shorten overall evidence
generation time. Thus evidence generation time is shorter than
the sum of times of each context delivery tool. Mean value
CONTEXT DATA ACQUISITION USING ADAPTIVE NON-REPUDIATION MODEL 201
and median differ significantly for some of tools (e.g. ping
and nmap). It is caused by the following characteristics of
research environment:
• 10% of packets generating IDS alerts came from mon-
itored network and were containing target address in
public network,
• 90% of packets generating IDS alerts came from public
network and were containing target address in monitored
network,
• Some machines in monitored network did not respond to
ICMP requests, and ping tool waited 10 seconds to reach
answer timeout,
• Due to law restrictions nmap scans were not performed
for addresses from outside of monitored network. Thus
the nmap execution time for that cases was nearly 0
seconds.
TABLE II
EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE FIGURES
Abbreviation Explanation
Evidence gen time Total evidence generation time
Ping dst Time of ping tool operation for destination
IP address
Nmap src Time of nmap tool operation for source IP
address
Ping src Time of ping tool operation for source IP
address
Nmap dst Time of nmap tool operation for destination
IP address
Nslookup dst Time of nslookup tool operation for desti-
nation IP address using 8.8.8.8 DNS server
Nslookup dst local Time of nslookup tool operation for desti-
nation IP address using local DNS server
Online geoIP dst Time of ipinfo.io tool operation for destina-
tion IP address
Offline geoIP dst Time of geoiplookup tool operation for des-
tination IP address
Whois dst Time of whois tool operation for destination
IP address
Online geoIP src Time of ipinfo.io tool operation for source
IP address
Offline geoIP src Time of geoiplookup tool operation for
source IP address
Nslookup src Time of nslookup tool operation for source
IP address using 8.8.8.8 DNS server
Nslookup src local Time of nslookup tool operation for source
IP address using local DNS server
Whois src Time of whois tool operation for source IP
address
Fig. 8. Evidence generation time and evidence components generation time
- part 1
Fig. 9. Evidence components generation time - part 2
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper the model of context-aware network non-
repudiation security service and its practical implementation
is presented. The implementation includes intrusion detection
system as real-time context analysing tool and other
network tools used for context acquisition about sites of the
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communication. On the basis of prepared implementation the
research on evidence generation time is described. Each tool
was evaluated according to measurements made in real life
environment.
Contextual non-repudiation may have applications in public
sector, where law regulations require reliable and elastic
evidence generation in personal data or other sensitive data
access control modules. Another field of applications may
constitute military and government systems sector, where the
strict regulations for classified information access monitoring
have to be fulfilled.
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